Does information technology (IT) raise the wages of those workers who have skills needed to use this technology? In the skill-biased technical change account, computers complement certain groups of workers, such as college graduates, raising demand and wages for these workers and increasing wage inequality. Card and Dinardo (2002) and Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz (2013) argue against this hypothesis as a major cause of inequality.
Aside from their critiques, the skill-biased technical change account has a significant shortcoming: it assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that some groups of workers already have the needed skills; often, "skill" is equated with a college education.
1 However, it might be that the skills needed to work with new technology are not pre-existing, but must, instead, be developed by working with the technology on the job. Indeed, a variety of evidence suggests that computer adoption involves organizational change and substantial investments in new skills, often learned on the job.
2
This might seem like a minor distinction, but it is important for at least two reasons.
First, it implies different policy remedies. If IT adoption increases the college wage premium, signaling an undersupply, then perhaps policy needs to boost college graduation rates (Goldin and Katz, 2004) . On the other hand, if critical skills are learned on the job for all users, then it might be better to target policies to increase opportunities for workers who lack college degrees (Bessen 2015) .
Second, mounting evidence suggests that the main impact of IT on wages comes with experience on the job rather than from increasing the returns to pre-existing skills. In the "canonical" model of skill-biased technical change (Acemoglu 2002) , IT augments skilled workers, raising their marginal productivity. Because pre-existing skills are not firm-specific, workers using IT should have higher wages than comparable non-using workers. Yet the best estimates suggest that this wage premium is quite small.
Most of the empirical support for skill-biased technical change comes from studies using aggregate data. While these studies cannot measure the wage premia associated with IT use, a number of papers have used micro-data. The micro studies find that the difference in wages, after controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity, is small-typically only a few percent-too small to have much impact on wage inequality. Initially, Krueger (1993) regressed log wages against a dummy variable for computer use and control variables, finding a 10-15% wage premium; he concluded that the computer wage premium accounted for as much as half of the growth in the college-high school wage premium. However, his estimates could suffer from sample selection bias-computers might tend to be assigned to workers who have unobserved ability that is also correlated with higher wages. 3 DiNardo and Pischke (1997) found that pencil use is also correlated with higher wages. Since pencils likely do not require specialized skills, the positive coefficient on pencil use suggests substantial selection effects.
Several studies have attempted to correct for selection bias by using longitudinal data from select short panels of worker data, estimating fixed or random effects models. They find evidence of substantial selection bias and only a small wage premium. Entorf and 3 Krueger attempted to control for ability by using data on achievement test scores and school performance. Kramarz (1997) , using a panel of French workers from 1985-7, find that computer users with no previous computer experience earn 6% more on average. Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz (1999) use a French panel from 1991-3 and find that a worker using a computer without previous experience earns 1% more. Pabilonia and Zoghi (2005) use a Canadian survey from [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Using a fixed effects analysis, they estimate a wage premium of 1%
for workers without computer experience; using an instrumental variable estimation, their wage premium estimate is not significantly different from zero. Dostie, Jayaraman, and Trepanier (2010) use the same dataset but they use a model with random effects for firms and workers; they find a 4% wage premium exclusive of computer experience.
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Other research is consistent with the finding of only a small wage premium for IT use. Borghans and ter Weel (2004) do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, but do control for computer skills, finding no significant relationship between these skills and the computer wage premium. Using a difference-in-differences design for the rollout of broadband in Norway, Akerman, Garder, and Mogstad (2015) find that local wages for skilled workers rise with the availability of broadband, but the effect is small.
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It seems hard to reconcile these findings of low IT wage premia with the skill-biased technical change hypothesis. How can a one-time IT wage premium of a few percent explain a rise, say, in the college-high school wage premium of 30% or more since 1980? The skillbiased technical change hypothesis holds that technology augments labor, but, presumably it 4 One concern with all of these estimates is the short panel duration. With short panels, identification in a fixed effects estimation comes from the small number of workers who switch computer use during the panel, possibly leading to measurement error and imprecise estimates. For this reason, Pabilonia and Zoghi (2005) use instrumental variables and Dostie, Jayaraman, and Trepanier (2010) use a model with random effects. Their estimates are not markedly larger, however.
5 They estimate that a 10% increase in the availability of broadband in a municipality increases skilled wages there by 0.2%, suggesting that the total effect of broadband use generates a wage premium on the order of 2%. Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2012) also find that advanced Internet applications are associated with faster local wage growth, however, their estimates do not translate easily to wage premia.
is the workers who actually use information technology who should be the main beneficiaries of higher productivity-computer tools primarily boosts the productivity of the workers who use them; when the Internet improves communication, it boosts the productivity of those workers who use it to communicate. While IT use in one occupation can affect workers in other occupations and industries (see Bessen 2016) , the main impact on worker productivity should be measurable among the skilled workers who use these tools. And the longitudinal studies suggest that this impact is small when measured for preexisting skills.
The picture is very different, however, if we consider skills learned through experience on the job. All of the panel data surveys above asked how many years each worker had been working with computer technology. Although this was not the main focus of these studies, the estimated impact of computer experience in each study is substantially larger than the wage premium associated just with computer use. The estimates of the wage premia associated with computer experience increase 1-2% per year.
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These findings hint at a significant growth in the returns to IT use over time, however, they suffer from two shortcomings. First, the panels are short and none are very recent, making it difficult to infer much about how this effect might have worked over the last few decades. For example, the most recent survey is from 1999-2002 and respondent's mean experience with computers was only 6 years. The panel regressions also include a quadratic term in computer experience, however, the short panel lengths and the low values 6 The regressions included computer experience plus computer experience squared, so the annual increases vary. Entorf and Kramarz (1997) report a 1-2% per annum increase in productivity with experience but that lasts a couple years. Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz (1999) report a total 2% gain over 1-3 years. Pabilonia and Zoghi (2005) obtain estimates of 1.2% and 2.0% productivity growth with computer experience in the first years. Dostie, Jayaraman, and Trepanier (2010) estimate returns to experience grow 1.0-1.6% per year during the first years.
of computer experience make extrapolation unreliable. Furthermore, these studies do not control for the selection of computer users and applications. Early computer users ("early adopters") are very likely different from those workers who begin using computers later on, using different applications. Inferences about the time pattern of wage growth based on selfreported computer experience in cross-sectional data might therefore be misleading.
The second problem is that wages might increase with job tenure for reasons other than growing computer skills. If these factors correlate with IT use, then estimates of the returns to IT experience will be biased even in fixed effects and random effects models.
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Measuring the growth in IT wage premia
This paper estimates the growth of wage premia for IT users by employing instrumental variables and data that cover a much longer time span: it uses 9 two-year longitudinal panels that cover computer and Internet use from 1989 through 2013. The data come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which asked questions about computer
and Internet use in a number of supplemental surveys. Although the CPS was designed primarily for cross-sectional research, it is possible to track individual workers and their wages over two years (Drew, Flood, and Warren 2014) .
Ideally, one could measure growth in an IT wage premium by regressing the change in wages against IT use. However, several other delayed payment mechanisms might also generate a rising wage-tenure profile including: self selection of prospective employees (Salop and Salop 1976) , insurance for risk adverse employees when productivity is uncertain (Harris and Holmstrom 1982, Freeman 1977) , and incentives to reduce shirking when productivity is costly to monitor (Lazear 1979) . These mechanisms all imply that wages will rise faster than worker productivity with tenure. To the extent that these mechanisms might be correlated with IT use-and there are good reasons to think this is the case-then the estimated effect of IT on wage growth will be biased.
To obtain unbiased estimates, I need to distinguish between wage growth that arises from worker productivity growth and wage growth that exceeds productivity growth. 8 This can be done with an instrumental variable that is correlated with IT use, but is uncorrelated with delayed payment mechanisms that raise wages faster than productivity. Below I select an instrumental variable based on institutional considerations and I validate that this variable is uncorrelated with an indicator of delayed payment. Although this variable is not randomly assigned, the institutional analysis supports its validity as an instrument.
The instrumental variable estimates for wage premium growth are substantial, a 1.3%-2.6% increase per year in real hourly wages for computer users and Internet users.
These estimates are in line with previous research, however, this paper finds that this wage growth does not appear to diminish substantially over time. The implication is that large costs are associated with learning to use IT. It also suggests that the critical skills are not those associated simply with using computers or the Internet per se, but rather skills associated with the ongoing stream of software, system improvements, and associated organizational changes.
Substantial growth in the IT wage premium also has significant consequences for wage inequality because access to IT is highly unequal. A firm's decision to assign a computer system to a given worker is a classic technology adoption problem (Hall and Khan 2003) . Theoretically, firms assign IT to workers when the productivity payoff exceeds the 8 I also distinguish between growth in productivity associated with IT and growth in the returns to other measured and unmeasured variables that might be correlated with IT. adoption cost. All else equal, more highly skilled workers will have larger payoffs to adoption so that skills should be correlated with IT adoption. Estimates of probit equations for computer and Internet use confirm this hypothesis. However, this means that IT-related learning will tend to exacerbate pay differentials. For example, because relatively more college-educated workers use IT than workers with just a high school education, the wages of college-educated workers grow faster as a group. In fact, on the job learning of IT-specific skills can account for the majority of the growth in the college-to-high school wage ratio since 1980.
Note, moreover, that this wage gap grows because more college-educated workers are given the opportunity to use IT, not because a college diploma is "required" to use IT.
The wages of non-college workers grow at the same rate or faster if they, too, are assigned computers and Internet. In this account, rising inequality does not signal an undersupply of college graduates; rather it suggests that the costs of learning new skills or other adoption costs may be holding back wage growth for many workers.
Model Skills and productivity
To explore IT adoption and wage growth, it is helpful to begin with a model of productivity. Consider the marginal productivity of worker i at time t. Let X represent measured worker characteristics, let U represent unmeasured characteristics that are correlated with wages, and let C = 1 if the worker uses IT and C = 0 if not. We observe different cohorts of workers, each at time, t, each cohort observed for two periods, T = 0, 1.
Their productivity might change with experience. Then the worker's marginal productivity can be written
where ! captures IT-related changes in productivity over cohorts, ! captures IT-related productivity changes with experience/learning, and !" represents random errors that are unrelated to worker characteristics, such as random measurement error in V.
The two time dimensions-t and T-capture different ways that skills can change with IT use:
• If IT makes workers more efficient but without requiring any new skills, then firms will adjust employment so that marginal productivity equals the market wage. Then, equilibrium marginal productivity will remain unchanged, ! = ! = 0.
• If workers who use IT are more productive regardless of their experience with the technology-that is, IT complements pre-existing skills-then ! will be positive.
• If IT users learn on the job, then ! will increase with worker's time on the job. This can be seen by reference to standard human capital models. On-the-job learning can be realized through investments training, mentoring, or learning-by-doing. In the classic human capital model (Becker 1964) , these investments take the form of training costs or the opportunity costs of lost production. Figure 1a illustrates the productivity of a worker who begins learning new skills with the use of new technology in her fourth year on the job. That year productivity drops because of training costs or production lost while learning, but it is more than offset by gains the following years. The difference between productivity in years 5 and later compared to the early years represents the return on the human capital investment.
In this case, ! < 0 < ! .
Many information technologies improve sequentially. New versions of software or
entirely new products are run on new and improved hardware. If such ongoing improvements each require some new skills, then the pattern would be repeated although perhaps with somewhat smaller magnitudes. This is illustrated in Figure 1b where continues to increase after the initial year of IT use.
With both a single innovation and sequential innovation, increases over tenure on average, despite some down years, since the net return to human capital is positive. The data in this paper capture two consecutive years labeled 0 and 1, but the data lack information on the number of prior years the worker has used IT. In effect, for IT users, the data capture an average over the years with IT use. And so, on average, if IT users learn on the job, then they will have
especially when IT innovation is sequential. This will not be the case for non-IT users and for pre-existing skills.
Wages
In a companion paper we will address the degree to which worker skills are firm specific or general. Abstracting away from these issues, I assume that in each period workers and firms split the value of the worker's output,
and might change with T for reasons explained below. Then
Adopting information technology
First, consider the adoption decision, that is, whether the firm chooses to assign IT to worker i. Suppose that there is an adoption cost, A. This cost might reflect the difficulty of developing an application for the given occupation or the firm's cost of training.
The firm will assign IT to worker i if the total profit over periods 0 and 1 exceeds A.
In the simplest case, assume that the returns to skill are constant over time so that adoption will occur if (suppressing the unchanging time subscripts and the error term)
This equation shows that workers with high U-unmeasured ability or other unmeasured characteristics that are correlated with wages as in (3)-should also be more likely to be assigned to work with information technology, all else equal.
It is helpful to express that correlation as an explicit linear relationship,
where U is normalized so the coefficient of C is 1. Then, redefining the error term, (3a) can be written
Expressed this way, the coefficient of C in an OLS regression will clearly be a biased estimate of the returns to computer use. Probit estimates of IT use below provide evidence that unmeasured characteristics that correlate with wages are also correlated with IT use.
Learning effects
However, the goal of this paper is to estimate Δ ≡ ! − ! , rather than the total return to IT use. One could estimate a first-differenced version of (5),
This approach has two problems. First, the coefficient of C clearly includes more than Δ .
The term Δ + Δ represents the change in returns to pre-existing computer skills and to unmeasured skills. Below I develop separate estimates of these. The second problem is that ∆ ln might be correlated with IT use. Since we have no independent measure of this variable, it cannot be included. Estimating (6) without it gives rise to omitted variable bias.
Below I develop instrumental variable estimates to overcome this limitation.
Data and variables
The main data source for this paper is the Current Population Survey (CPS) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In select years, a supplemental survey asked whether the respondent "directly used a computer at work;" in other years, the survey asked "do you access the Internet from work?" 9 The universe for these questions was employed persons of 15 years of age or older. I use these survey items as the measure of information technology use. Because these measures are self-reported, they may undercount cases where information technology is embedded in hardware. For example, radiologists might not call digital X-ray machines computers; similarly, cashiers might not call computerized check out terminals 9 Computer use was surveyed in October of 1984, 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2003 and For the basic data set, I use the sample of all workers who responded to the IT questions aged 15 through 65, excluding imputed responses. This sample includes 318,547 computer users and 216,300 Internet users. Figure 2 shows the share of IT users over time.
Estimating equation (6), however, requires longitudinal data that can be differenced.
Although the CPS was not designed as a longitudinal survey, I am able to construct short longitudinal panels using the method of Drew, Flood, and Warren (2014) and implemented in IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2015) . The CPS surveys households for four months and then, after a hiatus of eight months, they are surveyed for another four months. Wage data are collected in the fourth and final months (the so-called outgoing rotation groups 
Identifying the Learning Effect Trends in productivity coefficients
In order to use (6) to estimate Δ , it is necessary to estimate ≡ Δ + Δ , which represents the change in returns to pre-existing computer skills and to unmeasured skills.
Because my data covers different cohorts over decades, the average trend growth in these terms can be estimated by using a version of the levels equation (5) with a trend term.
Assuming that these trends grow at a roughly constant rate, we can write
so that equation (5) can be re-written
where I capture the tenure-related changes with a simple dummy variable here to focus on the long-term trends. to IT use. The second row estimates , the average annual increase in Δ + Δ , the returns to pre-existing and unmeasured skills. The estimates are about 0.2% per year. As we shall see, this figure is an order of magnitude smaller than the estimates of Δ obtained below.
Rising wages, job tenure, and IT use
A second hurdle to estimate learning effects using equation (6) is the possibility that Δ ln is correlated with IT use, creating an omitted variable bias. A significant literature provides reasons why firms might increase ln ! with tenure and these reasons might be correlated (perhaps negatively) with IT use. In particular, the major theoretical explanations for why wages might rise faster than worker marginal productivity depend on some sort of incomplete information about worker productivity that is revealed over time. Yet worker productivity might be easier to measure in those occupations that tend to use IT, making the error term negatively correlated with IT use. There is, indeed, evidence of such as association.
It is helpful first to look at several major theoretical explanations for why wage growth might diverge from productivity growth. In Lazear's model of shirking (1979), employers have difficulty monitoring worker productivity, although productivity is revealed over time. By paying workers less than their marginal productivity during their early years on the job and more than their marginal productivity later, workers will not shirk during the early years because they risk forfeiting their large future payout. In Salop and Salop (1976) , rising wages act as a screening device to weed out less productive prospective employees when their productivity is private information. Again, productivity is revealed after some time on the job. In Carmichael (1983), wages diverge from marginal productivity when employers have private information on productivity in a model with firm specific training. In Freeman (1977) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) , productivity information is symmetric but unpredictable; workers and firms learn a worker's productivity over time and rising wages act as a kind of insurance policy for risk-averse workers.
In all of these cases, a delayed payment mechanism is used because information about worker productivity is revealed over time. Yet one might expect occupations to differ in the degree to which productivity can be easily observed and/or predicted. Hutchens (1987) first proposed that occupational characteristics might be related to occupational differences in monitoring. He proposed specifically that occupations that involve repetitive tasks are easier to monitor and therefore should be negatively correlated with features of delayed payment contracts such as longer job tenure, mandatory retirement, pensions, and higher wages for more experienced workers. He found evidence to support those hypotheses using data for 1971.
Interestingly, some other research suggests that repetitive work is associated with computer use. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) find an association between computer use and the degree to which an occupation involves routine tasks. This means that computer use is likely negatively correlated with delayed payment. If so, then the error term in (5) is likely to be negatively correlated with IT use, biasing estimates of the learning effect.
Validating an instrumental variable
Instrumental variable estimation can correct for this bias, in particular, one using an instrumental variable that is correlated with IT use, but uncorrelated with delayed payment.
Hutchen's insight on the link between delayed payment and occupational characteristics such as job tenure provides a means for identifying occupational characteristics that are uncorrelated with delayed payment and which, therefore, might serve as instruments.
I begin by re-creating Hutchens's result using current data for occupations from the CPS and measures of job characteristics taken from the 1977 edition of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. While legal changes have largely eliminated mandatory retirement rules and have changed pensions to include employee-financed plans, job tenure still provides a useful indicator of delayed payment. If wages rise above marginal productivity, more experienced workers will have above-market wages, this should make them less likely to quit, and they should therefore exhibit longer job tenure on average. Table 3 shows several occupational characteristics grouped by their anticipated correlation with productivity monitoring. Two characteristics that would seem to make productivity measurement easier are the importance of repetitive tasks and routine tasks; two characteristics that might make monitoring more difficult are abstract and creative activities and jobs that involve making "generalization, evaluations, and decisions based on sensory or judgmental criteria." Worker productivity is likely easier to measure for repetitive and routine tasks and harder to measure when output is abstract, creative, or depends on individual judgment.
The correlations shown in Table 3 The bottom row of the table verifies that the STRENGTH variable is, in fact, uncorrelated with job tenure, implying that it is not correlated with the use of delayed payment mechanisms. Regardless of the particular mechanism responsible for an increase in ln with tenure, such an increase should be associated with greater average job tenure;
wages that rise faster than productivity discourage quitting. Because STRENGTH is not correlated with job tenure, it appears that this variable is independent of ln and is therefore a valid instrumental variable.
Estimates of Learning Effects
Basic estimates Table 4 shows regressions of equation (6), for the computer use on the left side and for Internet use on the right. Columns 1 and 4 show a simple uninstrumented regression.
Because the dependent variable, the one-year change in log wages, likely contains significant measurement error, I use Least Absolute Deviation estimates to temper the effect of outliers.
The estimates of the learning effect are 0.6% and 0.4% for computer users and Internet users respectively (standard errors 0.1% and 0.2%). These estimates are statistically significant, but are notably smaller than those from the literature using fixed effects or random effects models. This could be because differencing increases measurement error in the dependent variable, attenuating coefficient estimates (Griliches and Hausman 1986).
As noted above, the wage sample includes only about one third of the workers who report IT use. From the summary statistics ( contribution from trend growth in the returns to pre-existing and unmeasured skills, , the best estimates for the learning effect are 1.3% annual real wage growth for computer use and 2.6% for Internet use.
Interactions
These estimates are in line with the estimates reported by studies using fixed or random effects models. However, those studies employed short duration panels and had only a limited ability to infer longer time trends in wages. This finding might seem contrary to Entorf and Kramarz (1997) and Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz (1999) who see wage growth only lasting for the first few years of self-reported computer experience. 14 However, their finding might be misleading because the payoff to IT applications might change over time, especially during the early years of adoption. If so, the apparent slowing of wage growth with computer experience in cross-section might not reflect longitudinal time trends.
While my data do not capture individual worker's computer experience, we can make inferences about differences between newbie IT users and more experienced ones based on whether most workers in the occupation use IT or not. That is, a higher portion of IT users will be first-time users in occupations where few workers use IT; in occupations where most people use IT, most IT users will be experienced. The second panel in Table 5 shows the wage growth coefficient interacted with a dummy variable that is 1 if over half the workers in the occupation use IT. Both groups of occupations exhibit similar learning effects. This is consistent with the view that new IT technologies are requiring new skills on an ongoing basis.
The next panel interacts IT use with worker age. Older workers do not exhibit significantly slower wage growth. Conditional on their being assigned IT equipment, older workers apparently learn IT applications as quickly as younger workers.
The fourth panel explores whether more highly educated workers show greater wage growth. It is sometimes argued that college educated workers are better able to learn on the job and might therefore exhibit higher wage growth. These regressions interact IT use with a dummy variable that is 1 if the worker has some post-secondary education. The estimates show that more educated workers do not have larger learning effects; their wage growth with IT tenure is slightly lower, in fact, although not significantly so. Conditional on using IT, high school educated workers appear to learn just as well on the job.
The final panel explores whether learning might be particularly strong in occupations that are directly involved with computer, including computer programming, engineering, and mathematical occupations. 15 Results suggest that computer occupations do exhibit stronger learning effects, particularly for Internet applications, although the difference is not statistically significant.
Who uses information technology?
It is sometimes asserted that younger or better-educated workers are better at learning new technologies. The findings in Table 5 suggest that these groups of workers are not better able to acquire IT-related skills than older and less-educated workers, conditional on those workers being assigned to use IT. However, there are major differences in IT use across different groups of workers. This is not surprising because the analysis of technology adoption implies that the payoff to IT use may be greatest where the opportunity is greatest, that is, among more highly paid workers. With the exception of gender and retirement age workers (where the time horizon to capture returns on human capital investment might be limited), characteristics associated with higher wages also tend to have higher IT use. Some of these differences might be driven by unobserved worker characteristics, U, in equation (4), that might also be correlated with observed characteristics. Columns 3 and 6 include log real wages as an independent variable. However, because IT use is associated with wage growth, log real wages will be correlated with the error term. Consequently, I use an instrumental variables probit in these columns. I instrument each worker's wage with the quartile of the mean occupational wage for that worker's occupation in 1980 (and year dummies). The findings imply that unmeasured characteristics that affect wages are significantly correlated with IT use as well.
Discussion
My estimates are in line with estimates of the general rise of wages with job tenure.
After controlling for general changes in wage levels over time, Topel (1991) estimates that wages increase 2.5% for each additional year of tenure; Altonji and Williams (2005) estimate a rise of 1.1%. These are estimates for all workers, not just IT users, and these estimates include wage increases associated with delayed payment mechanisms, where my estimates use instrumental variables that are independent of delayed payment. Nevertheless, the similarity suggests my estimates are not unreasonable.
A variety of comparisons imply that the estimated learning effects correspond to a significant investment in human capital. Assuming that the increase in wages with IT experience can be attributed to returns on human capital, the absolute magnitude of the increase should be at least as large as the human capital investment. That is, the returns to human capital should be at least as large as the investment. Since the increase in pay represents the worker's share of the returns and since the worker's share is less than the total returns, the absolute increase in pay provides a lower-bound estimate for the investment in 17 Using the 2.8% estimate from Table 4 less the 0.2% trend estimate from Table 2. 18 From BEA NIPA accounts, The wage increases associated with IT use are also significant. In particular, because the use of IT is distributed unequally across different groups of workers, these increases affect wage inequality. For example, one common measure of inequality is the college-high school ratio, the ratio of the mean wage of workers with four years of post-secondary education to the mean wage of workers with only 12 years of schooling. Using the CPS outgoing rotation groups for 1980 and 2013, excluding self-employed workers, this ratio grew by 0.73% per year. Part of this rise could be explained by the rise of wages by IT users.
Because more college graduates than high school graduates are IT users-39% more, see Table 6 -the rise of wages with IT use will contribute to a growing gap in mean wages between college and high school workers. All else equal, an annual 1.3% increase in wages for IT users will increase the college-high school wage gap by 1.3% x 39% = 0.51% per year. 19 In other words, the rise of wages associated with IT use could account for most of the rise in the college-high school wage gap. This back-of-the-envelope calculation does not take into account how wages change when workers switch jobs. Nor does it take into account a variety of other factors, including relative supply and demand. Nevertheless, this crude calculation suggests that on-the-job learning provides a substantial tailwind toward increasing wage inequality.
Conclusion
Workers who use information technology tend to experience rising wages, relative to non-users and after controlling for a range of observed variables and instrumenting IT use.
! is the share of IT users among workers of education j = high school, college. Then the rate of change of ln
). I use 1.3% by taking the 1.5% estimated from column 3, Table 4 and subtracting 0.2% trend growth from Table 2 .
These increases are substantial-1.3 to 2.6% per year-and they have been persistent since 1989, even in occupations that already have high levels of IT use. These findings suggest that IT requires valuable skills that are learned on the job Much discussion of technology and skills has focused on pre-existing skills such as those skills acquired through formal schooling. But previous research has only found a small wage premium associated with computer use exclusive of experience, suggesting that computers do little to enhance the productivity of workers without computer experience. In contrast, this paper finds a much larger impact of IT use over time on the job. Moreover, workers without a college diploma benefit from substantial wage gains as much as collegeeducated workers when they use IT. These findings suggest that IT does complement skills, but the key skills are learned on the job rather than prior to employment. This difference has important implications for policy regarding training and skills development and also for several other issues. For example, it suggests a different view of the effect of IT on wage inequality. The skill-biased technical change hypothesis sees IT as increasing the relative demand for college graduates. But regardless of whether IT raises the demand for workers with college diplomas, a much higher proportion of college graduates are assigned to work with IT, so their wages rise faster thanks to this greater opportunity.
Also, the sustained pattern of wage growth through 2013 suggests that the impact of IT on productivity might not have "lost steam" after 2004 as some observers have suggested (Gordon 2016 , Fernald 2014 . IT spending surged during the late 1990s and subsequently declined, leading some observers to infer declining productivity benefits from IT. But the wages of workers using IT have continued to rise at a roughly steady rate, suggesting these workers are experiencing productivity improvements at the roughly same rate as in the past.
Further research is needed to understand the timing of the link between IT investment, ITrelated human capital investment, and the returns to these investments. Also, depending on the degree to which IT skills are firm-specific, large human capital investments in IT-related skills have important implications for worker mobility and employment dynamics, possibly causing a skills mismatch and slow job growth (Restrepo 2015) . Labor force participation might also be affected if many older workers' skills become obsolete.
The key question here is how new technology interacts with worker skills to unlock productivity benefits and wage increases. The answer is important for a host of issues today and also to understand the impact of future technologies. Mean values weighted by population weights. Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. "**" = significant at the 1% level; "*" = significant at the 5% level. Regressions also include year dummies and population weights. Time, t, is measured in years, including fractional months. The second and fourth regressions include interaction terms for education variables with time and age variables with time, coefficients not shown. Note: Table shows correlation coefficients with probability values of the null hypothesis (no correlation) underneath. "**" = significant at the 1% level; "*" = significant at the 5% level. Sample is occupation averages for each detailed occupation for each panel year, even years from 1996-2008. Standard errors clustered by occupation in parentheses. "**" = significant at the 1% level; "*" = significant at the 5% level. Year dummies not shown. Regressions use population weights. IT use is instrumented using the degree to which the worker's occupation involves STRENGTH and dummies for panel years (not shown). IV estimates use sample trimmed of 5% tails. Robust standard errors in parentheses. "**" = significant at the 1% level; "*" = significant at the 5% level. Only the interaction terms are shown for regressions corresponding to columns 3 and 6 of the previous table. Probit regressions show the marginal effects calculated at sample means. In columns 3 and 6, the log real wage is instrumented using the quartile of the worker's mean occupational wage in 1980. Probits use population weights. 
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